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IN-KIND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
The use of in-kind payments in combination with or in place of
pecuniary payments has become increasingly common in the settle-
ment of class action litigation.' In-kind payments are noncash com-
pensation from the defendant to the plaintiff class, usually in the form
of a coupon or scrip that class members can apply toward the
purchase of the defendant's products in the future.2 For example,
class members in one case recovered coupons valid for a discount on
the purchase of new food processors.3 Other class action plaintiffs
have secured discounts on transatlantic air travel,4 groceries, s homesite
purchases,6 bar review courses and legal texts, 7 and brokerage fees.8
Although in-kind payments may facilitate settlement, these noncash
agreements create unique difficulties for reviewing courts.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), 9 a court reviewing a
class action settlement plan assumes a general duty to assure the pro-
posal's adequacy.' 0 Although class action law favors settlement,1
courts have interpreted the Rule 23(e) inquiry as requiring a determi-
nation that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." 12 Courts
1 See Buchet v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 684, 691-92 n.5 (D. Minn. 1994)
(citing various in-kind cases); Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litig., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,473, at 69,473-74 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 1983); see also Fred Gramlich, Scrip Damages in Anti-
trust Cases, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 261, 262 & n.2 (1986) (discussing 20 scrip settlements between
1976 and 1986).
2 See 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12.05M, at
12-17 to 12-18 (3d ed. 1992).
3 See Cuisinart, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 69,467. For a general discussion of the
Cuisinart case, see Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. i, 13-16 (1993).
4 See Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 64o F. Supp. 683, 684 & n.5 (D.D.C. x986)
(discussing the settlement in In re Atlantic Air Travel Antitrust Litig., No. 84-1013 (D.D.C. 1986)).
5 See Ohio Pub. Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods, 546 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
6 See Tornabene v. General Dev. Corp., 88 F.R.D. 53, 56-57 (E.D.N.Y. i98o).
7 See Bonnie Phemister v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,234, at 66,987-88 (N.D. ll. Sept 14, 1984).
a See In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 305, 312 (D. Md.
1979).
9 Rule 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court .... " FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e).
10 The court's duty is to ensure that the interests of absent class members are adequately
represented in any settlement of the suit. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 805 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, x6 S. Ct 88 (1995); 2 NEWBERG
& CONTE, supra note 2, § 11.46, at ii-ioS to ii-io6; CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER
& MARY K. KANE, 7B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797, at 340-41 (1986).
11 See FED. R. Civ. P. i6(c) advisory committee's notes (directing courts to encourage settle-
ment); 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 2, § 1141, at 11-85 n.218; Janet C. Alexander, Do the
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 498 n.2
(1991).
12 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 2, § 1141, at 11-91; see In re General Motors, 55 F.3d
at 8o5; 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 1o, § 1797.a, at 378; Sylvia R. Lazos, Abuse in
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applying this standard cannot evaluate with certainty the likelihood
and potential amount of recovery at trial. The complex and specula-
tive nature of valuation of in-kind payments compounds that difficulty
by adding uncertainty to the settlement approval process.'3
Although some courts and commentators support in-kind pay-
ments, 14 others have called them "a joke,"'5 and "a scam and hypoc-
risy";16 one in-kind payment plan was labelled one of "the more
dubious settlements on record." 7 One court succinctly summarized
the sentiment against nonpecuniary class relief: "the defendants ... get
off cheaply, the . . . lawyers get the only real money that changes
hands and the court, which approves the settlement, clears its docket
of troublesome litigation."' 8 Despite such concerns, in-kind settlements
have yet to receive adequate academic attention. 19 This silence sug-
gests an implicit assumption that in-kind payments pose courts and
practitioners no greater difficulties than other class action settlements.
Similarly, by reviewing in-kind payments in the same manner as re-
view of other class actions, courts have tacitly suggested that in-kind
settlements pose only marginally greater complications under Rule 23
than other class action plans.
In-kind settlements create a troubling situation in which reviewing
courts must act as blindfolded fiduciaries. Although courts may sug-
gest otherwise,20 they often lack the information necessary to make
traditional Rule 23 review effective in the in-kind context. In fact,
close review of in-kind case law reveals signs of doctrinal chafing as
the difficulties of reviewing in-kind settlements under the "fair, reason-
able and adequate" test force courts to innovate at the margins. Ex-
Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotia-
tions, 84 MICH. L. Rav. 308, 320 (i985).
13 Commentators have noted that, in most class actions, settlement approval is perfunctory,
notice is often defective, settlement review is cursory, and appellate review is rare. See, e.g.,
Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protection for the Class and the Case for
Reform, 73 NEB. L. RaV. 646, 682-83 (x994).
14 See, e.g., Buchet v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 684, 691-92 & nn.5-6 (D.
Minn. 1994) (declining to reject the legitimacy of scrip settlements generally, noting the wide-
spread use and increasing popularity of scrip settlements in class actions, and citing numerous
court decisions and newspaper articles in support of such settlements).
Is Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons: Millions for Class-Action Lawyers, Scrip for Plaintiffs,
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at Dx (quoting a public interest attorney).
16 Id. at DS (quoting the editor of a publication on class actions).
17 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1, 45 n.131 (igg) (discussing the In re Cuisinart litigation).
18 In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 544-45 (N.D. Cal. i9go) (discussing injunctive
relief).
19 For two notable exceptions, see Gramlich, cited above in note i at 261, and Morawetz,
cited above in note 3, at 13-18.
20 See, e.g., In re Domestic Air Taansp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 3o8 (N.D. Ga. 1993)
("An analysis of the compromise reached in a class action entails a complete understanding of the
terms of the settlement and the negotiations leading up to the settlement.").
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amination of the negotiation dynamics that drive such settlements, and
of the review process itself, suggests that courts often look to factors
outside the scope of the traditional Rule 23 inquiry.
This Note's purpose is twofold: first, to isolate what characteristics
of in-kind payments create problems for reviewing courts; and second,
to identify prescriptive policy approaches for attorneys and judges as
they propose or evaluate in-kind settlement plans. The focus through-
out is on the unique dilemmas that in-kind payment creates for attor-
neys and reviewing courts. This Note argues that courts and attorneys
should explicitly consider these unique dilemmas and should structure
in-kind settlements to minimize their adverse effects.
Part I briefly describes the traditional analysis of class action settle-
ments under Rule 23 and reviews several in-kind settlement proposals
in detail. Part II discusses the unique dilemmas that in-kind settle-
ments create for reviewing courts. Part flI discusses the concept of
value-creation in negotiation and suggests several additional complexi-
ties that the possibility of value-creation poses to reviewing courts. Fi-
nally, Part IV analyzes evidence that courts innovate in this area, and
suggests several prescriptive steps to facilitate the review process and
increase the likelihood of approval of in-kind settlements.
I. IN-KIND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
Rule 23 imposes several potentially constraining requirements on
courts reviewing settlement proposals. First, Rule 23(a) requires in-
quiries into the numerosity of the class, the commonality of class mem-
bers' claims, the typicality of the class representatives, and the
"adequacy of representation" of the class as a whole.21 These four ele-
ments are intended to guide the court in determining whether the
named class members and their representatives adequately represent
the interests of the entire class, and whether the case is appropriate for
class disposition. In addition, Rule 23(e) permits court approval of a
class action settlement only after a judicial determination that such
settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." 22 This test has two re-
lated prongs. First, courts engage in "a substantive inquiry into the
terms of the settlement relative to the likely rewards of litigation."
23
Second, courts inquire into the negotiation process itself, focusing on
the question "whether negotiations were conducted at arms' length by
experienced counsel after adequate discovery."
24
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
22 See supra p. 8Io.
23 In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 796
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
24 Id. The Third Circuit distinguished between the Rule 23(a)(4) inquiry into "adequacy of
representation" and the "fair, reasonable, and adequate" inquiry focused on the process used by
the negotiating attorneys: "Although the procedural focus on the fairness determination yields in-
formation pertinent to the adequacy of representation inquiry, it cannot fully satisfy the inquiry."
[Vol. 109:810
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Several recent settlements illustrate how reviewing courts apply
this two-pronged approach to in-kind plans. In 1993, a district court
approved a $458 million settlement in a price-fixing suit against a
group of domestic air carriers. 25 The settlement included $50 million
in cash, $408 million in discount certificates applicable toward future
air travel, and $14 million in attorneys' fees.26 The court approved
the plan, despite its finding that the scrip's economic value to the class
was substantially less than the face value of $4o8 million.27 Noting
that "[b]y far the most important factor in evaluating the fairness and
adequacy of a settlement is the likelihood and extent of any recovery
from the defendants absent the settlement,"28 the court found that the
settlement adequately compensated the plaintiff class in light of the
uncertainties and costs of proceeding to trial and judgment.29 The
court also emphasized its finding that there was no evidence of fraud
or collusion between plaintiffs' attorneys and the airline defendants.
3 0
According to the court, "the settlement was achieved . . . only after
extensive and sometimes contentious arms' length negotiations."3 '
Similarly, in i99i, the district court in New York v. Nintendo of
America, Inc. 32 approved a settlement plan in which Nintendo agreed
to pay approximately $25 million in $5 coupons to the approximately
five million purchasers allegedly injured by a scheme that fixed the
prices of video game consoles and game cartridges.3 3  In addition,
Nintendo agreed that, if fewer than one million purchasers redeemed
their coupons, it would pay a guaranteed minimum of up to $5 million
to various state attorneys general.34 Finally, Nintendo agreed to pay
attorneys' fees and administrative costs of $i.75 million.35 The court
noted that the plaintiffs had "express[ed] doubts as to the evidentiary
standard they would have to meet and to their ability to prove dam-
ages," 36 and accordingly found that "[tihe coupons, while not an ideal
Id. Whereas the Rule 23(a)(4) test concerns whether the plaintiffs' representatives adequately rep-
resented the whole class, the fairness test measures the degree to which the attorneys negotiated
in good faith and at arm's length. See id. at 797; see also 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, sup-a note 2,
§ 1.28, at 11-S9 ("[T]he adequate representation requirement is satisfied when the court deter-
mines that the settlement was negotiated at arm's length and was not collusive in favoring the
class representative or class counsel at the expense of the class.").
25 See In re Domestic Air ransp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.RD. 297, 304-06 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
26 See id. at 305-06.
27 See id.
28 Id. at 324.
29 See id. at 35 ("[T]he novelty of plaintiffs' claims and the evidence . . . make success
uncertain .... In short, plaintiffs' slim chance of success on the merits ... weighs in favor of
approval of the settlement.").
30 See id. at 313, 348.
31 Id. at 323.
32 775 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 299i).
33 See id. at 679, 681-82.
34 See id.
3S See id.
36 Id. at 681.
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form of compensation, are adequate."37 Turning to the procedural
prong of the Rule 23 test, the court stressed that the presence of sev-
eral attorneys general as representatives of the plaintiff class alleviated
the court's fears of collusion.
38
Not all in-kind settlements, however, have survived Rule 23 re-
view. In a 1994 class action alleging fraudulent loan deferral practices,
a district court rejected an offer by ITT Consumer Financial Corpora-
tion (ITT) to settle the suit by issuing plaintiffs transferable scrip for
the purchase of noncredit life insurance policies. 39 The face value of
the certificates was $47,215,400, and ITT agreed to pay an additional
$26,000,000 in cash to plaintiffs' counsel for costs and fees.40 The
court "reluctantly" rejected the settlement and decertified the class on
the substantive ground that the value of the scrip was "simply too
tenuous and speculative in nature."4' Regarding the second prong of
the "fair, reasonable and adequate" test, the ITT court stressed that it
"d[id] not presume to second-guess counsel's evaluation of the merits
of this action or to challenge the integrity of the negotiations leading
up to this proposed settlement."42 Instead, the court focused on the
uncertain value of the coupons, the fact that the certificates would be
of no value to at least half the class, and ITT's refusal to guarantee
some minimum cash payment were the plaintiffs to fail to redeem
their certificates.
43
Finally, the Third Circuit recently rejected an in-kind settlement
plan proposed to end litigation over General Motors (GM)'s liability
for fuel tank defects in its pick-up trucks. 44 The settlement plan pro-
posed to grant class members a $iooo coupon applicable toward the
purchase of a new truck 4s or to allow class members to designate a
third party transferee to receive a $500 coupon.46 According to the
district court, which approved the settlement, the total economic value
37 Id.; see also 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 2, § 11.46, at ix-iio to 11-112 ("The settle-
ment does not have to be a brilliant one in order to secure judicial approval.).
38 See Nintendo, 775 F. Supp. at 68o-S.
39 See Buchet v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 684, 686-87 (D. Minn. 1994). The
coupons also included certain annual thrift club memberships or reduced prices on new loans.
See id.
40 See id. at 687-88.
41 Id. at 691-92.
42 Id. at 691.
43 See id. at 692, 694, 696. Cf New York v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 676, 679
(S.D.N.Y. iggi) (approving a settlement under which the defendant agreed to a guaranteed mini-
mum value of $5 million out of a potential $25 million settlement).
44 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Thuck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
777-79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 1z6 S. Ct. 88 ('995).
4s The $iooo coupon was transferable only to either an immediate family member (subject to
restrictions) or a purchaser of the class member's existing vehicle. See id. at 780.
46 See id.
[Vol. 109:81o
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of the plan was "between $1.98 billion and $2.18 billion."47 In addi-
tion, GM agreed to pay $9.5 million in attorneys' fees.4
The Third Circuit found that the settlement plan failed to satisfy
Rule 23(a) on several grounds. First, it created intraclass conflict be-
tween individual truck owners and fleet owners, for whom the in-
trahousehold transfer option was essentially worthless.4 9 The court
also found reason to doubt that the Rule 23(a) requirement of ade-
quacy of representation was satisfied, and noted that the large fee of
$9.5 million "would yield very substantial rewards to [the attorneys]
after what, in comparison . . . was little work."50 Finally, the court
rejected the settlement under the "fair, reasonable, and adequate" test
on both substantive and procedural grounds. The court questioned the
plaintiffs' valuation of the coupons in light of the fact that no proce-
dure had been designed to ensure that all class members received at
least some value from the settlement, the lack or inadequacy of a sec-
ondary transfer market for the coupons, and the fact that the settle-
ment seemed to be a sophisticated GM marketing plan.s5 The court
also expressed concern that the settlement occurred too quickly, after
insufficient discovery.
5 2
These four cases suggest several preliminary observations concern-
ing the efficacy of the Rule 23(e) "fair, reasonable, and adequate" ap-
proach to review of in-kind settlement proposals. First, as Domestic
Air and Nintendo demonstrate, in the face of uncertain recovery
through continued litigation and absent evidence of attorney collusion,
courts approve in-kind settlements even if actual settlement value is
questionable.53 Second, even in such circumstances, courts may reject
an in-kind plan if they have access to reliable information that sug-
gests a low incidence of coupon redemption. 4 Finally, courts facing
truly hard cases - such as the General Motors case - in which there
is some threat of collusion and little reliable information about the
plan's value, may reject the settlement and emphasize the uncertain
value of the in-kind plan. Part II attempts to explain why courts
reach these varied outcomes.
47 Id. at 782.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 8oi.
so Id. at 803.
51 See id. at 807-o.
S2 See id. at 814.
S3 In the IT case, for example, the court noted that it "approache[d] its evaluation of the
proposed settlement mindful of the factors that favor compromise," because it had no reason to
doubt that both parties properly weighed the strengths and weaknesses of the litigation. Buchet
v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 684, 693 (D. Minn. r994).
S4 Despite its compromise-oriented approach, the IT court rejected the settlement proposal,
partly because a previous ITT in-kind settlement plan had solicited few certificate redemptions.
See id. at 695-96.
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II. THE DILEMMA FOR REVIEWING COURTS
Review under the "fair, reasonable, and adequate" standard is es-
sentially an "economic valuation of the proposed settlement"55 by
which courts attempt to analyze "the value of the settlement itself to
determine whether the decision to settle represents a good value for a
relatively weak case or a sell-out of an otherwise strong case.1
5 6
Courts ask whether the plaintiff class will receive benefits substan-
tially comparable to those available through proceeding with the litiga-
tion. In simple economic terms, a court attempts to compare the
settlement's value to the expected value of proceeding to trial, ad-
justed for costs and risk.
5 7
Determining the value of the expected trial outcome poses certain
well explored problems. Courts may not engage in a pretrial mini-trial
on the merits but nevertheless must evaluate the strength of each
side's case, estimate the costs of trial, and discount for the possibility
that any award will be nonrecoverable 58 Although difficult, the eval-
uation of this half of the substantive equation is well within the
court's traditional purview 9 and presents no dilemmas unique to the
in-kind context.
In-kind payments introduce acute problems, however, in the analy-
sis of the settlement value. Although courts attempt to monetize an
in-kind settlement's present value to facilitate comparison to the likely
trial outcome,60 such valuation places a heavy burden on the reviewing
court. For example, valuation of scrip settlements requires a court to
hear and weigh evidence on the number of coupons that experts pre-
dict consumers will redeem, the effect of transferability provisions, and
the present value of the certificates.
6 1
In some cases, such analysis is relatively easy. In the ITT litiga-
tion, for example, the defendant's expert witness admitted that ap-
proximately half of the class members would not qualify for new loans
because of poor credit histories and thus would be unable to use the
discount coupons offered as part of the settlement.6 2 In addition, the
court drew on the experience of an earlier ITT scrip settlement in
5S In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 8o6
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, xz6 S. Ct. 88 (1995). Some commentators have approached the problem at
a substantive level and attempted to define for courts the bounds of a "fair and adequate" settle-
ment. See Morawetz, supra note 3, passim; cf. Peter T. Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settle-
ment: Theory and Practice, 1991 J. Disp. REsOL. i, 5-7 (offering a valuation model for lawyers
and clients).
56 General Motors, 55 F.3d at 806.
57 See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 2, § 11.4r, at ii-go.
58 See, e.g., WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note io, § r797, at 356.
59 For a useful discussion of case evaluation, see generally Hoffman, cited above in note 55, at
3-7.
60 See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 2, § 11.41, at ii-90g , § 11.46, at II-IIo.
61 See In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 320-21 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
62 See Buchet v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 684, 694 (D. Minn. 1994).
[Vol. 109:81o
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which only approximately three percent of the plaintiff class redeemed
their coupons.63  Not surprisingly, the court found the value of the
scrip too tenuous to accept.
More often, however, valuation of in-kind payments is extremely
difficult.64  Courts rarely have the benefit of analogous, let alone di-
rect, precedent as in ITT.65 In addition, although courts are generally
adept at complex factual findings, judges normally base their conclu-
sions on a solid foundation of evidence amassed and tested through
adversarial allegation and discovery. When reviewing class settle-
ments, however, a court may have little reliable evidence with which
to work because the attorneys for both parties have abandoned their
adversarial stance. 66 Although this problem is common to all class set-
tlement approval hearings, its effects are exacerbated in the in-kind
context because the court must depend upon presented evidence not
only for the valuation of the likely trial outcome, but also for the valu-
ation of the settlement package.
Courts thus face great uncertainty in applying both substantive
components - the settlement value and the likely trial outcome - of
the Rule 23(e) test. To complicate matters further, this uncertainty
both derives from and stimulates courts' suspicion of attorneys' mo-
tives for agreeing to in-kind payments. Commentators often question
whether class action counsel have colluded with a defendant and
thereby deprived the plaintiff class of value.67 Many fear that class
attorneys will accept a suspect in-kind settlement in exchange for the
defendant's commitment, implicit or explicit, to pay higher attorneys'
fees. 68 The use of scrip only heightens this fear. Particularly if a de-
63 See id. at 695.
64 See, e.g., Downs, supra note 13, at 696 ("Under the current settlement procedure, courts
generally do not have access to information that may be essential for purposes of evaluating fair-
ness, such as the options that were considered and rejected in settlement negotiations, the issues
that were discussed, the class opponent's reactions to various proposals, and the amount of com-
promise necessary to obtain resolution through settlement.).
65 See, e.g., Domestic Air, 148 F.R.D. at 322 ("[No comparable certificate program exists from
which to obtain reliable data and estimate the use of the certificates with certainty . . .
66 See, e.g., 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 2, § M1.42, at 11-95 (noting that, at the ap-
proval stage, "both the plaintiffs and the settling defendants are the proponents of the settlement
and are no longer in an adversarial position with respect to requesting court approval"); Elliott J.
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can
Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2066 (1995) ("T.al judges
are not well situated to evaluate the parties' joint presentation at settlement hearings . . ).
67 Agency theory suggests that contingent fee attorneys have incentives to settle actions early
and with little personal investment of time or resources. See, e.g., Downs, supra note x3, at 665;
Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 23-24; Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 66, at 2074 ('T]he
potential for opportunism in class actions is so pervasive, and evidence that plaintiffs' attorneys
sometimes act opportunistically so substantial, that it seems clear plaintiffs' attorneys often do not
act as [the plaintiffs'] 'faithful champion.").
68 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fair-
ness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 877, 883 (1987) (describing
"sweetheart settlement[s]" in which "the plaintiff's attorney trades a high fee award for a low
recovery"); Mary K. Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer,
1996]
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fendant believes that the class members ultimately will not redeem a
large amount of the issued scrip, the defendant may be willing to set-
tle for a high face value in certificates, along with a correspondingly
high cash fee to the plaintiffs' attorneys, secure in the expectation that,
in the end, the defendant will pay only the fee plus some nominal
amount.69 With respect to scrip settlements, as the General Motors
court noted, there can be the "sense that counsel may have pursued a
deal with the defendants separate from, and perhaps competing for the
defendant's resources with, the deal negotiated on behalf of the
class."
70
Courts can, of course, hope that Rule 23 review and approval will
prevent agency conflict. 'Even unscrupulous attorneys know that they
bargain in the shadow of Rule 23 .71  Given the severe consequences
for plaintiffs' lawyers of a Rule 23 class decertification should the re-
viewing court refuse to approve a scrip settlement, courts may look to
Rule 23 to deter class attorneys considering a side deal with a willing
defendant. Moreover, the importance of maintaining a good profes-
sional reputation may deter attorneys from unscrupulous behavior.
72
Firms that represent class-action plaintiffs must jockey before courts
for the right to represent lucrative classes; thus, their reputations
before the judiciary are vitally important in this context. Reputational
effects create incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to accept only those
scrip settlements that appear worthwhile for the plaintiff class.
Nevertheless, agency costs seem excessive in this context. The
complex and speculative nature of in-kind plans can blindfold courts
and force them to act in the absence of reliable information on which
66 TEX. L. REv. 385, 389 (1987); Andrew Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settle-
ment, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 1i5 (1976) ('Incentives exist for offers by the defendant of a greater
attorney's fee in exchange for the acceptance of a smaller award to the class."). But see
Morawetz, supra note 3, at 14 n.40 ("[There is reason to think that there is more going on in the
selection of non-cash remedies than merely an effort to trade in good claims for attorney fees.").
For a summary of agency theory, see JOHN W. PRATT & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1-36 (iggi).
69 See Gramlich, supra note i, at 265-66 (discussing a hypothetical example of such collusion
and suggesting that "[scrip... obscures the small size of the damages defendants actually pay to
plaintiffs").
70 In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 803
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 88 (x995). The inability of the plaintiff class to monitor its
representatives leads to agency problems. In this context, not only will the plaintiff class usually
lack information about its attorneys' incentives and effort, but the class will also be unable to
ascertain what nonscrip settlements the defendant would have accepted had no scrip plan been
available.
71 See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 95o passim (1979) (discussing the relationship between
the formal legal system and informal bargaining behavior).
72 Only recently have legal scholars systematically considered the importance of maintaining a
professional reputation in the legal domain. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 509, 525-27, 557-61 (1994) (describing the importance to litigators and law firms of repu-
tations as either "cooperators" or "gladiators").
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to base their decisionmaking. Given these difficulties, attorneys are
likely to press courts to relax the degree of parity required under Rule
23(e) between the expected trial outcome and the settlement value.
Some courts do accommodate uncertainty and do not require that the
plaintiff class receive exactly the same benefit as the present value of
the outcome of actually going to trial.73 Instead, courts have held that
the fact "[tihat the proposed settlement amounts to a fraction of poten-
tial recovery does not render the proposed settlement inadequate and
unfair. 'In fact, there is no reason .. .why a satisfactory settlement
could not amount to a hundredth or even a thousandth part of a sin-
gle percent of the potential recovery."' 7 4 In addition, some courts ac-
cept imprecision when estimating the value of in-kind settlements. In
Domestic Air, for example, the court acknowledged that "a precise dol-
lar valuation cannot be given," and instead entertained a range of pos-
sible values.
75
Relaxing the extent to which the parties must demonstrate a settle-
ment's value or the degree to which the settlement must approximate
the expected trial outcome amplifies the threat of attorney collusion in
this context. Plaintiffs' attorneys and defense counsel may propose in-
kind settlements precisely because of the courts' extreme dependence
on submitted evidence for the economic valuation of such plans. To
the extent that courts fail to evaluate proposed settlements rigorously,
attorneys stand a better chance of succeeding in collusion and are thus
more likely to propose such settlements.
Thus, "fair, reasonable and adequate" analysis of in-kind settle-
ments presents unique methodological difficulties for courts. In the in-
kind context, courts have little reliable information on which to base
decisions to approve or deny settlement proposals, and few ways by
which to determine whether a settlement creates value for the plaintiff
class or merely constitutes a collusive distributive scheme between
plaintiffs' counsel and the defendant.
Ill. VALUE CREATION AND THE ATTORNEY'S DILEMMA
As discussed above, courts fear that unscrupulous plaintiffs' attor-
neys may collude with their opponents and thereby provide inadequate
representation for the class.76 This Part explores the possibility that
73 See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 2, § II46, at II-IIo.
74 In re Domestic Air Tansp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 325 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (quoting
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974)) (approving a settlement valued at
approximately 12.7% to 15.3% of the minimum possible court recovery).
7S Id. at 323. The General Motors court, however, rejected the district court's finding that
the settlement was worth between $1.9 and $2.2 billion on the ground that the figures were pro-
duced by experts who "clearly lacked a sound methodological basis." In re General Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 818-i9, 822 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 88 (1995).
76 See supra pp. 817-18.
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even honorable attorneys - with no collusive intentions - may feel
pressure to behave in ways that appear similar to collusion. In-kind
payments present this additional problem because such settlements po-
tentially involve value-creating negotiations. This Part discusses the
concept of value creation and explores why value creation complicates
Rule 23(e) review.
A. Value Creation
Negotiations involve more than the distributive allocation of finite
resources between competing parties. Rather, negotiators can reach in-
tegrative or value-creating settlements. 77 Such settlements are econom-
ically efficient, or "pareto optimal," because they waste less and
capture more of the potential surplus in the parties' transaction.7 8 Ef-
ficiency gains occur because the parties find and exploit trades that
offer incremental benefits to one that exceed the incremental costs to
the other.
The parties' different relative valuations are often the most impor-
tant source of value in integrative bargains. 79 If the parties' relative
77 See, e.g., MAx H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 72
(1992) (discussing distributive and integrative bargaining); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SM.
ENCE OF NEGOTIATION 33 (1982) (dividing two-party bargaining into two types - distributive
and integrative - and describing the latter as a process by which the parties cooperate for joint
gains); James White, The Pros and Cons of "Getting to YES," 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. u15, xx6 (1984)
("[S]ome would describe a typical negotiation as one in which the parties initially begin by cooper-
ative or efficiency bargaining, in which each gains something with each new adjustment without
the other losing any significant benefit."). But cf. RoY J. LEWICKI, JOSEPH A. LITTERER, JOHN
W. MINTON & DAVID M. SAUNDERS, NEGOTIATION 107 (2d ed. 1994) ("Most situations are
mixed-motive, containing some elements that require distributive bargaining processes, and others
that require integrative negotiation.").
Insufficient attention has been given to the value-creating role that lawyers can play in both
dispute resolution and deal-making negotiation. For examples of work in this area, see Ronald J.
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239
passim (1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword to Business Lawyers and Value
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1, 7-14 ('995); and Robert H. Mnookin, Creating Value
Through Process Design, II J. INT'L ARB. 125 passim (1994).
78 See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrING TO YES 58-83 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d
ed. 199I); DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 137-62 (i981). Although classical econo-
mists often assume that rational actors will always seek to maximize gains by exploiting all avail-
able value, negotiation analysts have long argued that negotiating parties often "leave value on
the table" notwithstanding the possibility of further cooperative gain. See, e.g., James K.
Sebenius, Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review, 38 MGMT. SC. 18, 21 & n.6
(1992); Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 93, 94
(1992).
79 Negotiating parties can exploit four basic sources of value: the parties' differences, shared
interests, economies of scale, and opportunities to dampen strategic opportunism. See DAVID A.
LAx & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION
AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 88-116 (1986); see also BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 77, at 94-101
(discussing the use of differences in expectations and in time and risk preferences to create value).
Differences in resources, relative valuations, forecasts about the future, risk preferences, and time
preferences can all create value. See BAzERmAN & NEALE, supra note 77, at 17 ("If you clearly
identify your priorities before a negotiation, you can find effective trade-offs by conceding less
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valuations of a given exchange differ, the trade may benefit one more
than it harms the other. For example, if an aggrieved plaintiff believes
that a defendant has damaged the plaintiff's house, it may be cheaper
for a defendant who is a carpenter to repair the damage and to con-
tribute some additional new construction than to compensate the
plaintiff in cash for the cost of third-party repairs. The carpenter can
trade what is cheap to her for what is valuable to the other party.
In-kind payments may similarly evidence a creative use of the dif-
ferent relative valuations of defendants and class plaintiffs. A greater
amount of scrip may serve as a substitute for a lesser amount of cash,
just as carpentry repairs can take the place of cash compensation.
80
Thus, if a defendant is willing to offer more total value in coupons
than in cash, and if, dollar for dollar, the coupons are worth the same
to the plaintiffs, a scrip settlement may be economically optimal.,'
Even if the plaintiffs do not value the coupons on a par with cash, an
in-kind settlement can be value-creating as long as the defendants pay
sufficient extra scrip to compensate for the plaintiffs' difference in
valuation.
In some situations this opportunity for value creation may advance
settlement discussions and make possible an otherwise foreclosed nego-
tiated agreement. Without scrip there may be no zone of possible
agreement between the defendants and the plaintiffs because the de-
fendants cannot offer enough to make settlement worthwhile for the
plaintiffs, and vice versa.8 2 In Domestic Air, for example, the court
noted that in-kind payments seemed necessary because of the defend-
ants' dire financial circumstances; a cash compensation plan could
have bankrupted the airlines.8 3 By creating value through a scrip of-
fer, the parties facilitated pretrial settlement.
B. The Attorney's Dilemma
The potential for value creation in in-kind settlements places attor-
neys in a dilemma that compounds the courts' problems. Sophisti-
cated practitioners know that exploiting opportunities for value
creation may facilitate settlement and benefit the plaintiff class. Value
important issues to gain on more important ones.") LAX & SEBENIUS, supra, at go-io6; cf Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving,
31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 787 (1984) ('[A]t the core of the zero-sum conception is an assumption that
parties value [a] fixed resource equally.").
80 Cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute
Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 J. DisP. RESOL. 25, 33 ("[M]ost negotiations, like most
lawsuits, are converted into linear, zero-sum games about money, where money serves as the
proxy for a host of other needs and potential solutions such as ... substitute goods.").
81 Class members are unlikely to value an in-kind dollar equally to an actual dollar. Whereas
a cash settlement plan allows a given plaintiff to determine how to spend her payment, coupons
are by nature restricted and thus less valuable for some.
82 See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 79, at 48-50.
83 See In re Domestic Air "IYansp. Antitrust Litig., r48 F.R.D. 297, 324 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
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creation, however, is not easy; "[a]n essential tension in negotiation ex-
ists between cooperative moves to create value and competitive moves
to claim it."84 This tension arises because, although distributive bar-
gaining requires that negotiators guard valuable information carefully,
value creation generally requires negotiators to share information in
order to trade on differences and complementarities.1s Thus, for a
value-creating negotiation to occur in the above carpenter example,
the homeowner must disclose that she would accept in-kind repairs
rather than cash, but doing so might prevent her from extracting a
higher cash settlement from the carpenter by bluffing or exaggerating
her demands. In distribution, unreciprocated disclosure can be danger-
ous; in value-creation, it is often essential.
The Rule 23 review process compounds this dilemma. Not only
must negotiating attorneys face the inevitable tension created by the
threat of exploitation, but plaintiffs' attorneys may also hesitate to en-
gage in cooperative behavior, such as sharing information, for fear of
signaling to a reviewing court that the negotiation was not conducted
at arm's length and in good faith. In short, the cooperation necessary
to generate value-creating scrip settlements may necessarily raise the
inference of collusion.
Plaintiffs' attorneys often respond to this dilemma by exaggerating
the benefits that the scrip plan will confer on the plaintiff class. For
example, in Domestic Air, plaintiffs' counsel argued that the certifi-
cates' aggregate value was "penny for penny and dollar for dollar the
face amount of the certificate[s]" - totaling $458 million.86 Similarly,
in the ITT case, the settlement proponents originally claimed that the
settlement was worth the full face value of the scrip package.
87
Not surprisingly, courts have rejected such claims. Moreover, class
attorneys risk that their exaggeration of the benefits to the class may
be taken as evidence of a stronger allegiance to the settlement plan -
or to the defendants - than to their clients. Again, plaintiffs' attor-
neys face a quandary: although they feel pressure to argue the settle-
84 LAx & SEBENIUS, Supra note 79, at 33.
85 As one commentator has noted:
What complicates matters is that, while lying may be the watchword in distributive bar-
gaining, full and truthful disclosure is the key to identifying and exploiting opportunities
for integrative bargaining. Thus certain kinds of lies, told to secure distributive (pie-split-
ting) advantages, may make it impossible for the parties to discover and exploit the in-
tegrative (pie-expanding) opportunities that may be available.
Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IowA L. REV. 1219, 1228 (iggo); see
also G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Tust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts, 44
VAND. L. Rv. 221, 253 (1991) ("Scholars have long recognized that most negotiations present
bargainers with mixed incentives that make cooperation extremely difficult. Negotiators want to
receive the benefit of cooperation, but also seek to minimize their exposure to risk of
exploitation.").
86 Domestic Air, 148 F.R.D. at 320.
87 See Buchet v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 684, 693 (D. Minn. 1994).
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ment's adequacy in order to secure approval, such advocacy can, of
itself, create the appearance of collusion.
IV. WHAT SHOULD A COURT Do?
Parts II and 1I have suggested that in-kind settlements present
unique difficulties for both courts and attorneys. If these dilemmas
occur in practice, innovative judicial responses might be expected as
courts cope with the requirements of Rule 23(e) review in the face of
uncertainty.
Most commentators have suggested that courts should respond to
the problems of Rule 23 review by bolstering the quality and scope of
information available about settlement value. Some have recom-
mended that courts appoint special guardians to monitor pretrial class
action negotiations.88 Others have suggested mandatory disclosure
rules regarding conflicts of interest between the class and its attor-
ney,89 or special attorney-client privilege rules granting absent class
members full access to communications between class counsel and the
named plaintiffs.90 Although such approaches would ideally eliminate
information asymmetries between the court and the attorneys regard-
ing settlement value, they do not address the possibility of collusion.
Assuming that perfect information will never be available because
of the structure of the Rule 23 process and the difficult substantive
valuation problems that in-kind payments introduce, how should
courts proceed? This Part describes several examples of innovative
settlement provisions that have at least partially alleviated courts' con-
cerns about the valuation of in-kind payments. It then explains why
these innovations do not fit precisely within the confines of the two-
pronged Rule 23(e) test, and argues for further extensions of the ap-
proaches they exemplify.
A. Example One: Market Discipline
Scrip settlements incorporate a variety of market provisions. At
one extreme, some offer plaintiffs a choice between a premium value
coupon or a discounted cash payment - for example, a $iooo coupon
or $500 in cash 91 - that constitutes a direct translation of coupon
value into a predetermined cash amount. At the other extreme, in-
kind settlements can restrict or deny transferability. In the General
Motors litigation, for example, the defendants stipulated that, in order
to sell a coupon, a class member first had to find. a willing buyer and
then exchange the class member's $iooo original certificate for a $500
88 See, e.g., Lazos, supra note 12, at 326-29.
89 See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1186-9I
(1982) (discussing such a solution in the context of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions).
90 See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Class Actions: Fashioning an Exception to Pro-
mote Adequacy of Representation, 97 HARv. L. REv. 947, 956 (1984).
91 See, e.g., In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (D. Md. 1983).
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transferable coupon issued in the buyer's name.9 2 In addition, the set-
tlement permitted only one such transfer per coupon.93 In rejecting
the settlement proposal, the reviewing court noted that "the one-time
transfer restriction ... precludes the development of a market-making
clearing house mechanism."94 Other settlements merely permit trans-
ferability without explicitly creating a market mechanism.
95
In analyzing such provisions, courts generally focus on several is-
sues: whether all class members will be able to use the scrip; whether
the settlement plan erects formidable procedural hurdles to scrip use;
whether the coupons are transferable; and, if so, whether a secondary
market for the coupons is likely to provide an active outlet for those
class members seeking to trade or sell their scrip.96 On its face, this
focus on secondary transfer markets merely appears to be one factor in
the difficult calculus of in-kind valuation. Although consideration of
market mechanisms does facilitate such valuation, it is also justified at
a more fundamental level. Given the uncertainty that courts face in
reviewing in-kind settlements, market forces are likely to be the only
real discipline on the parties. The existence of a secondary market is
of particular significance when a settlement proposes to offer coupons
valid toward the purchase of expensive goods. If the typical class
member will only infrequently purchase the good in question, that in-
dividual's scrip will rarely be of much value absent an efficient trans-
fer mechanism. Open marketability disciplines the settlement by
ensuring that payment in-kind will ultimately amount to payment in
cash, instead of no payment at all.
Nevertheless, although transferability diminishes the likelihood that
a low redemption rate will shrink the benefit to the plaintiff class and
confer a windfall on the defendant, a market mechanism does not
quell all doubts regarding a settlement's value. Class members will
necessarily receive less than face value for even a freely transferable
certificate, given that transfer entails some transaction costs. Although
class members may receive adequate compensation relative to the
likely trial outcome if given sufficient scrip, the fact remains that
courts reviewing a proposed settlement will have little information
about what price the market will ultimately sustain for the coupons.
Only if a court can anticipate the scrip's future market price can it
determine the quantity of scrip that would satisfy the class claims. On
92 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3 d 768,
809 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (igg5).
93 See id.
94 Id. The Third Circuit found that the district court erred "when it presumed development
of a liquid market for these transfer certificates with very little support in the record for it." Id.
95 See, e.g., In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 309, 321 (N.D. Ga.
1993) (discussing the importance of transferability); Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litig.,
1983-2 Trade Cas. (CC) 65,473, at 69,471 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 1983) (noting the relevance of
transferability).
96 See, e.g., General Motors, 55 F.3d at 8o9.
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balance, however, an in-kind settlement that incorporates transfer pro-
visions and market mechanisms alleviates some of a court's uncer-
tainty in determining whether a settlement's value is fair and
reasonable under Rule 23.
B. Example Two: Minimum Guaranteed Payments
In addition to ascertaining whether an in-kind settlement allows
for development of a secondary market, courts often consider whether
the settlement plan guarantees at least some minimum payment by the
defendant. In determining the adequacy under Rule 23 of a proposed
settlement, courts are required to adopt the perspective of the absent
class members.97 Accordingly, the distributive consequences borne by
the defendant need not correspond to the adequacy of the settlement.
Nevertheless, some courts have sought to determine whether a pro-
posed settlement guarantees that the defendant will bear some mini-
mum burden. In the General Motors litigation, for example, the Third
Circuit explained that "although the degree to which a settlement
hurts a defendant is not ordinarily a measure of the settlement's ade-
quacy, the fact that this settlement might actually benefit GM .. .
certainly does little to allay the concern that the settlement did not
advance the interests of the class as much as it might have."
98
The difficulties of Rule 23 review discussed in Part II may explain
judicial interest in whether costs are borne by defendants. Although a
court may be uncertain about a settlement's value, such uncertainty
will be partially alleviated if the settlement provides that the defend-
ant will bear some minimum burden. Thus, again, the settlement's
terms may create mechanisms that discipline the parties even if the
judiciary cannot.
Some settlements have stipulated a minimum cash contribution in
the event that the class fails to redeem a set number or percentage of
the issued coupons.99 In the Nintendo settlement, for example, the de-
fendant agreed that if fewer than one million purchasers redeemed the
$5 coupons, Nintendo would pay the difference - up to $5 million -
into a fund for use in antitrust enforcement. 100 In the ITT case, how-
97 See supra note io.
98 General Motors, 55 F.3d at 803. This characterization of the purpose of settlement com-
ports with the classic image of negotiation as a zero-sum situation in which each party tries to
dominate the other strategically. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Nego-
tiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. Rlv. 637, 638 (1976) ("Negotiation...
is conventionally perceived as a relatively norm-free process centered on the transmutation of
underlying bargaining strength into an agreement by the exercise of power, horse-trading, threat,
and bluff."); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 79, at 764-67 (describing the traditional model of adver-
sarial or "maximizing victory" negotiation).
99 See, e.g., In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 564 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (D. Md.
1983); Ohio Pub. Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. i, 5 (N.D. Ohio I982)
(providing for payments to charities if certificates were not redeemed).
100 See New York v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 676, 679 (S.D.N.Y. i99i).
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ever, the defendant refused to guarantee a minimum cash contribu-
tion.1O1 In rejecting the settlement, the court noted that "ITT asks the
Court to find that the certificates have a significant value to the class
members but is unwilling to establish a bottom line."
102
As discussed in Part I, estimation of the "bottom line" is the cen-
tral problem facing courts in their review of in-kind settlements. Even
if they are contingent on a failure by the class members to redeem
their certificates, minimum cash contributions can thus reduce the un-
certainty that courts face as they attempt to compare the settlement
value to the expected trial outcome.
C. Example Three: Mixed Attorney Compensation
In most scrip settlements, attorneys seek pure cash compensation.
Occasionally, however, settlements incorporate a third type of guaran-
tee that the attorneys have negotiated at arm's length: attorney com-
pensation that mixes cash and scrip. At least one court has required
plaintiffs' attorneys to accept partial payment in-kind, explaining that
"because they have expressed faith and confidence in the value of the
settlement for their clients, it is not unreasonable to require them, to
some extent, to stand equally with plaintiffs in sharing in the distribu-
tion in kind." 03 Such mixed fee arrangements increase a court's cer-
tainty about a settlement's value by reducing the likelihood that
plaintiffs' counsel has exaggerated the coupons' value. By aligning the
incentives of class and counsel, the settlement diminishes the advan-
tages of such exaggeration.
Various mixed compensation systems could serve to increase confi-
dence in the value of in-kind settlements. At one extreme, attorneys
might accept full compensation in coupons and thereby demonstrate
their belief that a secondary market will permit the transfer of scrip to
cash. Needless to say, even full in-kind compensation cannot eliminate
the possibility of collusion by the plaintiffs' attorneys and the defend-
ants; the plaintiffs' attorneys could receive an elevated quantity of
scrip value on the implicit understanding that each coupon would be
heavily discounted when traded. If class members then received only
an allocation calculated according to face value, the class would
thereby be defrauded of value. To mitigate this risk, attorneys could
accept a cash fee contingent upon the ultimate redemption rate by
class members: if few coupons were redeemed, the plaintiffs' attorneys
would receive less cash. Regardless of the specifics of these mixed or
contingent compensation schemes, however, each demonstrates that,
by more closely aligning the incentives of the attorneys and the class,
a settlement can impose discipline upon the parties and thereby dimin-'
ish a reviewing court's uncertainty.
101 See Buchet v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 684, 696 (D. Minn. 1994).
102 Id. at 696.
103 Brown Co. Sec. Litig. v. Gulf & W. Indus., 355 F. Supp. 574, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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V. CONCLUSION
In each of the above examples - market discipline, minimum
guaranteed payments, and mixed attorney compensation - courts re-
quire some demonstration, rather than mere assertion, that a scrip set-
tlement has value. In each, a settlement includes a mechanism to
assure the court that the agreement's terms will be substantively fair.
Despite the valuation difficulties that the use of scrip poses, such inno-
vations assist a reviewing court in determining the adequacy of a set-
tlement under Rule 23. Instead of exaggerating the benefits of a scrip
settlement, or minimizing the difficulties of Rule 23 review, attorneys
and courts can consider whether such mechanisms will impose disci-
pline on the parties.
From a policy perspective, extending such innovations creates a fi-
nal dilemma. On the one hand, these disciplinary innovations partially
alleviate the pressure that in-kind settlements place on reviewing
courts; to the extent that parties propose or courts insist upon such
terms, these innovations may enable courts to ensure the continued
viability of traditional Rule 23(e) review in this context. The innova-
tions may assuage the fears of courts and commentators and reduce
the call for reform. On the other hand, such innovations may generate
momentum for more fundamental change in the class action review
process. Ideally, a court could insist upon or fashion such settlement
provisions and tailor them to provide the appropriate level of disci-
pline in the case at bar. To make such disciplinary innovations truly
effective, a court would require the power to approve a settlement
contingent upon later reapproval if, for example, a secondary market
ultimately set a fair price for the plaintiffs' coupons. The current ap-
proach to class action review, however, forbids such ongoing manage-
ment of a settlement; a court must approve or reject, but cannot
meddle. 0 4 Thus, taken to their extreme, these innovations, and the in-
kind payments that give rise to them, suggest a need for basic changes
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
104 See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 2, § 1.41, at 11-94.
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